Front Line Op-Ed: FIFA’s Democracy Needs a Firewall Between Money and Votes

Nuno Perestrelo0

Launched on 4 June 2026 in Record, Portugal’s leading sports newspaper, SIGA’s weekly opinion column Linha da Frente (Front Line, in Portuguese) provides a dedicated platform to address issues at the heart of SIGA’s global agenda, including Sport Integrity, good governance, transparency, accountability, financial integrity, sports betting integrity, sustainability, youth development and protection, and the future of sport.

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FIFA’s Democracy Needs a Firewall Between Money and Votes

FIFA should generously fund football development. But when a national association depends on the international governing body to cover its essential expenses, the independence of its vote becomes a legitimate governance question.

 Mohammed Hanzab, Chairman of the International Centre for Sport Security (ICSS); Vice-Chair, SIGA Council

There is something admirable about FIFA’s most basic democratic rule. England has one vote. Brazil has one vote. France has one vote. So does every other member association. In a truly global sport, this equality matters. Without it, the countries with the largest television markets, the richest leagues and the greatest commercial revenues could turn world football into a private club.

But equality of votes does not necessarily mean independence of votes.

That distinction is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. FIFA is not only the institution whose president, budget and strategic direction are determined by its members. It is also a major source of funding for those same members.

Under FIFA Forward 3.0, each of FIFA’s 211 member associations can receive up to USD 1.25 million per year for operational costs, in addition to up to USD 3 million for projects during the 2023–2026 cycle. And these amounts could soon increase substantially. On 28 July, FIFA announced a proposal — still subject to approval by its members — to make USD 20 million in Forward funding available to each association for the 2027–2030 period, together with the possibility of a further USD 20 million per association for exceptional special projects.

This could represent significant investment in football development. But it also makes a difficult governance question more urgent.

The problem is not development funding. The problem is dependency.

FIFA should redistribute some of the wealth generated by world football. An association from a small country should not be deprived of pitches, coaches, women’s football or youth competitions simply because its domestic television market has little commercial value. Football’s universality depends, in part, on resources flowing from markets where the game is commercially strongest to those where investment is needed.

But there comes a point when assistance can become institutional dependency. If an association cannot sustainably pay its staff, maintain its administration or run its essential football activities without FIFA money, can its vote on FIFA’s leadership and financial policy truly be considered independent?

I am not suggesting that any particular association has sold its vote, nor that any specific FIFA payment has bought one. An allegation of that nature would require evidence. My concern is with the system itself. Good governance should reduce conflicts of interest and relationships of dependency before there is any need to prove the existence of an illicit arrangement.

The simplest answer would be to declare that any association receiving FIFA money loses its vote at Congress. I do not believe that would be fair, and it would be virtually impossible to apply. A grant to build a training centre is clearly different from depending on FIFA money to pay salaries.

Such a solution would also raise a legitimate suspicion: that football’s wealthier nations were seeking to redesign FIFA for their own benefit. A voting system based on commercial power would represent no progress at all. It could reduce the influence of Africa, Asia, Oceania, the Caribbean and other football regions simply because their domestic markets generate less revenue.

The criterion, therefore, should have nothing to do with wealth. It should be independence.

FIFA should create and publish a “Financial Dependency Index” for each member association, showing what proportion of its recurring operating revenue comes from FIFA funds used for current expenditure. Capital grants and development projects genuinely earmarked for specific purposes should be treated separately. The figures should be independently audited, and the thresholds established following serious economic and governance analysis, rather than through political negotiation.

As a starting point for discussion, an association could be considered financially independent when FIFA operational support represents less than 25% of its recurring operating revenue; developing between 25% and 50%; highly dependent between 50% and 75%; and structurally dependent above 75%. I do not regard these percentages as definitive. They serve to illustrate the principle: dependency should be measured transparently rather than ignored.

A small association should be able to meet this test on a modest budget. GDP, population, FIFA ranking, World Cup qualification or the absolute level of revenue should not be relevant. An association that sustainably generates USD 2 million in its own recurring revenue may be more independent than a much larger organisation with weak controls and chronic dependence on external transfers.

Financial independence should also be accompanied by minimum governance requirements: independently audited accounts, transparent procurement, credible elections, effective conflict-of-interest rules, safeguarding and integrity mechanisms, and functioning domestic competitions. These standards should apply to everyone. A wealthy association with serious governance shortcomings should not qualify simply because it has money.

It is equally essential that FIFA’s president, Council and administration should not decide which associations meet the criteria. Giving the incumbent leadership the power to determine who may vote would create a greater problem than the one the reform is intended to solve. Certification should be entrusted to an independent body, with published criteria, public decisions and a right of appeal.

Nor does suspending full voting rights need to be the first response. There is a well-established rule in corporate governance and public life: anyone with a direct and material financial interest in a decision does not participate in the vote on that decision.

An association exceeding an agreed dependency threshold could retain its vote on matters relating to competitions, statutes and general football issues, but be required to abstain from voting on decisions that directly and substantially increased the funding on which it depends. A hybrid system may therefore be more sensible than blanket exclusion: minimum governance standards for full voting rights, mandatory abstention where there is a direct financial conflict, and a transitional independence programme where operational dependency is extreme.

The period leading up to a FIFA presidential election deserves special protection. During the 12 months preceding the vote, exceptional grants to specific associations should require independent approval. Payments should follow published schedules. Material financial transfers should be disclosed promptly. Candidates should not be allowed to promise specific financial advantages to particular associations. The less discretion political office-holders have over the timing and destination of money, the less room there is for suspicion that football development and electoral politics are becoming intertwined.

The World Cup raises a related question. The 2026 edition expanded from 32 to 48 teams. There are legitimate arguments for giving more countries access to football’s biggest stage, and it would be simplistic to describe expansion, in itself, as vote-buying. But any future change should be supported by an independent assessment of sporting quality, the integrity of qualification, player workload, commercial effects and global development.

The size of the World Cup should be determined by what improves the competition and football, not by whatever electoral value someone might attach to additional places.

The strongest criticism of my proposal is that it could become a sophisticated means of stripping influence from football’s less wealthy nations. That risk is real. Any reform that, in practice, hands greater control to Europe or other wealthy markets should be rejected.

That safeguard should be built into the system itself: no GDP test, no population test, no ranking criterion, no requirement to generate revenues comparable to those of a major European association — and no permanent category of second-class members.

An association that does not meet the independence standard should enter a “Development and Independence Programme”. FIFA funding should continue and, in some cases, might even need to increase, but with a clear objective: helping the association develop domestic revenues, stronger competitions, sponsorship capacity, better administration and more robust financial controls. Full voting rights would be automatically restored as soon as the objective criteria were met.

This would also give FIFA a better way to measure whether development is actually working. Success should not be assessed solely by the amount of money distributed. It should also be measured by the ability of associations to become stronger and progressively less dependent on FIFA for their institutional survival.

The principle of “one member, one vote” deserves to be defended. It is one of the safeguards that prevent football’s wealthiest nations from taking control of the global game. But preserving equality should not require us to pretend that financial dependency has no impact on institutional autonomy.

FIFA should generously fund development. Small associations should retain a meaningful voice. Wealth should never determine political rights. At the same time, the institution being governed should not be the indispensable financial lifeline of those who elect its leadership without safeguards to manage the resulting conflict.

The principle is simple: solidarity should strengthen independence, not replace it.

Ultimately, “one member, one vote” should mean one independent vote.

– THE END –

Previous Front Line articles

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